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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
VALLEY INVESTMENT CO.,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAIL~
ROAD COIVlPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendant and
Res-pondent.

Case No.
7300

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record shows that the above-entitled case came
on for trial before the Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, one
of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sitting without a jury,
on the 7th day of April, 1948, William D. Callister
appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, and A. U. Miner appearing on behalf of the Defendant.
The record further shows that the Plaintiff and the
Defendant, in open court, stipulated as follows, to-wit:
On March 29th, 1894, one Charles A. Dole had the
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fee title to all of Lots 3 to 20, inclusive, and Lots 53 to 58,
inclusive, of Block 5, and all of Lots 13 to 16, inclusive,
Block 6, Dole's Addition, located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah (Tr. 40 and 41). On the said March 29th,
1894, the said Charles A. Dole conveyed said property to
Osca£ F. Hunter (Tr. 41), and the chain of title descended
through various parties (Tr. 41 to 46, inclusive) , to one
Irene Hunter Chamberlain, who, on February 29th, 1936,
received title through a bargain and sale deed. (Tr. 46)
On November 21st, 1947, the said Irene Hunter Chamberlain, now known as Irene H. Chamberlain McAlpine; executed a quit-claim deed to the said property to Valley Investment Co., the Plaintiff herein (Tr. 47, and Exhibit
uA", Tr. 79).
The general property taxes for 1930 on said property
being unpaid, a treasurer's tax sale took place on December
22nd, 1930 (Tr. 49, and Exhibit No.2, Tr. 79). The taxes
for the years 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1935 also remaining unpaid, and there having been no redemption of the
treasurer's sale for the unpaid 1930 taxes, an auditor's tax
deed on said property was executed on March 31st, 1936,
to Salt Lake County (Tr. 49, and Exhibit No. 3, Tr. 79).
On November 7th, 1941, Salt Lake c·ounty executed a
deed to said lots, naming Defendant as grantee (Tr. 49 and
SO, and Exhibit No. 4, Tr. 79). The assessment rolls of
Salt Lake County for 1930, and particularly the volume in
which said property was assessed, did not have affixed
thereto the· two auditor's affidavits required by Sections
5982 and 6006, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917 (Sections
80-7-9 and. 80-8-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943) (Tr. 69
and 70).
The Defendant has paid all taxes assessed against said
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property for the years 1942 to 1947, inclusive (Tr. 50),
and has been in possession of said property from August,
1941, to the present time, the Plaintiff and its predecessors
in interest having not physically occupied said property
since March 31st, 1936 (Tr. 51 to 67, inclusive).
After the trial had been concluded, and in due course,
the Court found in favor of the Defendant and against the
Plaintiff (Tr. 16), and made and entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (Tr. 25 to 32,
inclusive) , to which Plaintiff objected, submitting therewith its own proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and decree (Tr. 17 to 24, inclusive).
The particular portions of the Findings, Conclusions
and Judgment to which Plaintiff objected, are set out below (italics added) :
uFINDINGS OF FACT"
u6. That under date of February 29,_ 1936, Mindwell
C. Hunter by a bargain and sale deed conveyed or purported to convey to Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine the
property hereinabove described. That on November 21,
1947, by quit-claim deed said Irene Hunter Chamberlain
McAlpine conveyed or purported to convey said property
to the plaintiff Valley Investment Co." (Tr. 26)
u7 ........ That said taxes as so assessed for the year
1930 were not paid to Salt Lake County, and that on the
22nd day of December, 1930, a Treasurer's sale of such
property for delinquent taxes was made to Salt Lake
County. That thereafter said taxes were not paid nor :re·deemed and on the 31st day of March, 19 36, pursuant to
the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of
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Utah of 1933, said property was struck off to Salt Lake
County and an auditor's deed issued to Salt Lake County
therefor based upon said sale which had been made on the
22nd day of December, 1930, on account of said delinquent
and unpaid taxes assessed for the year 1930." (Tr. 27)
u9. That although said property was on December
22, 1930, sold for delinquent taxes assessed in 1930, said
property was not at any time thereafter redeemed by plaintiff nor by any of the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, nor were any of the taxes paid thereon, and subsequent
taxes for the years 19 31 to 19 3 5, inclusive, were not paid
and were added thereto; that after the issuance of the
auditor's deed to Salt Lake County on March 31, 1936,
said property was carried on the county rolls as property
of Salt Lake County and no taxes were assessed against nor
paid upon the same, and during the summer of 1941 the

defendant Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company negotiated with the County for the purchase of said property
for the purpose of constructing thereover a spur track to
serve the Remington Arms Plant. That as a result of said
negotiations and for a valuable consideration the defendant
Railroad Company purchased said property from the County and under date of November 7, 1941, Salt Lake County
made, executed and delivered to the defendant a county
deed by which it conveyed or purported to convey to the
defendant the property h·ereinabove described." (Tr. 27
and 28)
u12. That the above described real p·roperty was struck
off and sold to Salt Lake County on March 31, 1936, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 0-1 0-66, Revised
Statutes of 1933; that h')' amendment contained in Chapter 101 of Laws of Utah of 1939, various portions of Chap-
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of Title 80 of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 1vere
amended and by such amendment the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, relating to
property being struck off to the County, were transferred
to and embodied in Section 80-10-68, Sub. 6, and said Secfer 10

tion 80-10-68 as so amended was thereafter incorporated
in and carried unchanged into Utah Code Annotated 1943
as Section 80-10-68." (Tr. 28 and 29)
u13. That although the real property hereinabove described was sold to Salt Lake County for delinque·nt taxes
on the 22nd day of December, 1930, and although said
property was struck o.ff to Salt Lake County pursuant to
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, and an
auditor's deed therefor issued to the County on the 31st
day of March, 1936, and in spite of the fact that the defendant received a deed to said property from the County
under date of November 7, 1941, and went into possession
and has held possession of the same since November 7, 1941,
neither the Plaintiff nor any predecessor in interest or title
of the plaintiff has filed nor attempted to file any action
for the recovery of said property or for the possession thereof during any of said period of time, nor at all, until the
above entitled action was commenced herein by the filing
of Plaintiff's complaint on the lOth day of January, 1948."
(Tr. 29)
((CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
u1. That the cause of action set forth or attempted to
be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is bar.red by the
provisions of Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as so designated and enacted by Chapter 19, page 22,
Laws of Utah 1943. (Tr. 29)
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u2. That the cause of action set forth or attempted

to be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is barred. by the
prov:isions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, des1gnated
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947. (Tr.
29 and 30)
u 3. That the cause of action set forth or attempted to
be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is barred by the
provisions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943.
(Tr. 30)
u4. That the defendant is entitled to a judgment in its
favor and against the plaintiff, tno cause of action.'"
(Tr. 30)

UJUDGMENT

uNow, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and
decreed that the defendant Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, a corporation, be and it is hereby given
judgment in its favor and against the Plaintiff Valley Investment Co., a corporation, cno cause of action,' and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. (Tr. 31)
celt is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the
Plaintiff Valley Investment Co., a corporation, be and it
is hereby barred and enjoined and prevented from hereafter
prosecuting or maintaining any action for the recovery
of the following described property or for the possession
of any part or portion thereof, to-wit:
Lots 3 to 20 and Lots 53 to 58 of Block 5; and Lots
13 to 16 of Block 6, Dole's addition. (Tr. 31)
ult is further ordered that defendant be .
. d
giVen JU g-
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ment for its costs herein incurred, hereafter to be taxed.,
(Tr. 32)
After having been served with a copy of the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, portions of
which are set out above, and prior to the time the Court
signed the same, the Plaintiff prepared and served on the
Defendant, and filed with the Court, its proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and decree, portions of which
are set out below, in the place and stead of those signed
and filed by the Court:
((PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
u6. That under date of February 29th, 1936, Mindwell C. Hunter executed a bargain and sale deed conveying
said property to the said Irene Hunter Chamberlain; that
on the 21st day of November, 1947, Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine, formerly Irene Hunter Chamberlain,
by quit-claim deed, conveyed all her right, title and interest
in and to said property to the Plaintiff herein, Valley Investment Co." (Tr. 18)
u7 .......... that said taxes as so assessed for the year
1930 were not paid to Salt Lake County and that on the
22nd day of December, 1930, a purported Treasurer's Sale
of such property for delinquent taxes was made to Salt
Lake County; that thereafter, said taxes were not paid,
and on the 31st day of March, 1936, pursuant to the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933.,
an auditor's tax deed was issued to Salt Lake County therefor, based upon the said purported Treasurer's Sale which
had been made on the said 22nd day of December, 1930,
on account of said delinquent and unpaid taxes assessed
for the year 1930." (Tr. 18 and 19)
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u9. That neither the Plaintiff nor its predecessors in

interest have paid the said taxes for the year 19 30, nor for
the years 1931 to 1935, inclusive; that after March 31st,
19 3 6, the said property was carried on the tax rolls of Salt
Lake County as p~roperty of Salt Lake County, and were
not assessed·' that on the 7th day of November, 1941, for a
valuable consideration, Salt Lake County made, executed
and delivered to the Defendant a county tax deed describing the property mentioned above." (~r. 19)
.

u12. That since the Defendant took possession of the
property herein described, in August, 1941, no action was
brought heretofore against this Defendant, by the Pl~in
ti:ff or its predecessors in interest; that the Defendant has
held adversely against this Plaintiff and its predecessors for
a period of six years and five months, and no longer; that
the Plaintiff and its predecessors have not been in actual
physical occupancy of said property during the said period." (Tr. 20)

((PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That the assessment of taxes on the property described above, for the year 1930, and the Treasurer's Sale
on the 22nd day of December, 1930, of the same, are null
and void. (Tr. 20)
u2. That the· auditor's tax deed executed by the auditor of Salt Lake C'ounty, on the 31st day of March, 1936,
in favor of Salt Lake County, is null and void and is of no
' passed to
effect, and no interest in an~ to said property
the County of Salt Lake by VIrtue of it. (Tr. 20)
u3. That the payment of the consideration to Salt Lake
County by the Defendant herein, on the 7th day
No·
c(

of
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vember, 1941, for a purported tax title, extinguished the
lien for taxes and freed the property concerned from the
encumbrance whlch theretofore existed; that the tax deed
made, executed and delivered by Salt Lake County, on the
said 7th day of November, 1941, to the Defendant, describing said property, conveyed no inte·rest in and to said
property to the said Defendant; that Plaintiff is ov1ner of
the fee title to the same. (Tr. 20)
u4. That the predecessor of the Plaintiff he·rein, holding legal title_ to the said property, by virtue of the provisions of Section 104-2-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, also
held constructive possession of t4e property concerned until the month of Auglist, 1941, which included the first
seven months of ·the se~en-year p·eriod immediately· prior
to the commencement of this. action; that the Plaintiff's
predecessor in interest thus held possession of the property
within seven years prior to the commencement of th~s
action, as required by the provisions of Sectior1 104-2-5,
Utah Code Annotated 1943. (Tr. 20)
tt5. That the property described above, was not conveyed to the County of Salt Lake by auditor's ·tax deed,
and therefore does not come within the provisions of Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah, 1943, designated as Section
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by
Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah, 1947. (Tr. 20 and 21)
u6. That Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943,
designated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah
1947, does not provide a reasonable time in which to bring
actions which accrued prior to the time of its enactment,
for the recovery of real property conveyed to Salt Lake
County prior to September 1st, 1939, by auditor's deed
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under the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes
of Utah 1933; that the provisions of the said Chapter 19,
page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section 1042-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947, insofar as the same relate
to real p~roperty conveyed to the county prior to September
1st, 1939, by auditor's tax deed, are un;constitutional and
therefore void. (Tr. 21)
u7. That the Plaintiff herein is entitled to a decree of
this Court declaring, ordering and adjudging that the
Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of said real property,
and that the Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or
interest whatever in or to said real property or any part
thereof. (Tr. 21)
ns. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this
Court forever enjoining and debarring the said Defendant
f,rom asserting any claim whatever in or to said real property adverse to the Plaintiff herein. (Tr. 21)
u9. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this
Court for all costs of court herein expended." (Tr. 21)
UPROPOSED JUDGMENT
uNow, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and
decreed:
1. That the Plaintiff, Valley Investment Co., a corporation, is the owner in fee simple of the property described below, and that the Defendant, Los Angeles & Salt
Lake Railroad Company, a corporation, has no right, title,
interest, estate orJien whatever in or to said property or
any part thereof:
u
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Lots 3 to 20, inclusive, and Lots 53 to 58, inclusive,
Block 5, and Lots 13 to 16, inclusive, Block 6, Dole's
Addition. (Tr. 22)

uz. That the Defendant, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, a corporation, be and it is hereby forever
enjoined and debarred from asserting any claim whatever
in and to the said real property described abov.e, adverse
to the Plaintiff herein. (Tr. 22)
u3. That the Plaintiff, Valley Investment Co., be and
the same is hereby awarded its costs herein expended, hereafter to be taxed." (Tr. 22)
Subsequent to the signing and filing of the findings
of fact, conclusions of law· and judgment by the said Court,
the Plaintiff filed. its motion for a ·new trial (Tr.. 3 3),
which was subsequently denied (Tr. 3 5).
·Appellant, the Plaintiff below, contends that the trial
Court, in making and entering ·its findings, conclusions
and judgment, and in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new
trial, committed error as follows:

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Error No.1.
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No. 6
(Tr. 26) to the effect that Mindwell C. Hunter uconveyed
or pu·rported to convey" the property involve·d in this action, to Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine, who later
((conveyed or purported to convey" the said property to
the Appellant, does not conform to the· stipulated and undisputed evidence produced at the trial.
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Error No.2
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No.
7 (Tr. 27) to the effect that a treas:urer's sale of the property conce·rned to Salt Lake County took place, and that
said property was ustruck. off" to Salt Lake County, is contrary to the stipulated and undisputed evidence produced
at the trial.

Error No. 3.
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No.9
(Tr. 27 and 28) to the effect that said property was usold"
for delinquent taxes assessed in 1930, and that during the
summer of 1941, the Respondent unegotiated'' for the
purchase of, and did upurchase, said property, does not
conform to the stipulated and undisputed eviden~e produced at the trial.
Error No. 4.
The fa.ct found by the trial court in its finding No.
12 (Tr. 28) to the effect that said property was tcstruck
off and sold" to Salt Lake County, is contrary to the stipulated and undisputed evidence produced at the trial.
Error No. 5.
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No.
12 (Tr. 28 and 29) to the effect that by amendment Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, reiating
to property being ustruck off" to the county, were trans-
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ferred to and embodied in Section 80-10-68, Sub. 6, is
contrary to fact and law.
Error No. 6.

The fact found

l?Y the trial court in its finding No.

13 (Tr. 29) to the effect that said real property was usold"
to Salt Lake County in 1930, and was ustruck off" to
Salt Lake County in 1936, is contrary to the stipulated
and undisputed evidence produced at the trial.
Error No. 7.
The trial court erred in not finding the facts as proposed by the Plaintiff herein -(Tr. · 18 to .20, inclusive),
particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 9, and 12 thereof.
Error No. 8.
That the conclusion of law No.· 1 (Tr. 29) to the
effect that Plaintiff's caus.e of action is barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated, as
so designated and enacted by Chapter 19, page 22, Laws
of Utah 1943, is erroneous and contrary to law.
-Error No.9
That the con.clusion of law No.2 (Tr. 29 and 30) to
the effect that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the
provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, designated
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947, is
erroneous and contrary to law.
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Error No. 10.
That the conclusion of law No. 3 (Tr. 30) to the
effect that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943,
is erroneous and contrary to law.
Error No. 11.
l

That the conclusion of law No. 4 (Tr. 31) to the
effect that Defendant is entitled to a judgment in its favor
of uno cause of action", is erroneous and contrary to law.
Error No. 12.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that the assessment of taxes for 1930 on said
property, and the Treasurer's Sale on December 22nd,
1930, are null and void. (Proposed conclusion No. 1,
Tr. 20)
Error No. 13.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that the auditor's tax deed (Exhibit No. 3, Tr.
79) is null and void, and that no interest in said property
passed to Salt Lake County by virtue of it. (Proposed conclusion No. 2, Tr. 20)
Error No. 14.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that the payment by Defendant for a purported
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tax deed to said property, extinguished the lien for unpaid
taxes, and that said tax deed conveyed no interest to De·fendant, and that Plaintiff is the owner of the fee title to
the same. (Proposed conclusion No. 3. Tr. 20)
ErrorNo.15.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that the Plaintiff's predecessor in interest to said
property, under the provisions of Section 104-2-7, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, held constructive possession of said
property for seven months of the seven-year period immediately prior to the commencement of this action, as required by Section 104-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
(Proposed conclusion No.4, Tr. 20)
Error·No. 16.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that inasmuch as the· said property was not conveyed to the County of Salt Lake by Auditor's tax deed
and was not struck off and sold to Salt Lake County, said
property does not come within the provisions of Chapter
19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by
Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947. (Proposed conclusion No. 5, Tr. 20 and 21)
Error No. 17.
That the trial court .erred in not concluding as a matter of law that inasmuch as Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of
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Utah 1943, designated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 8, page· 19, Laws
of Utah 1947, does not provide· a reasonable time in which
to bring actions for the recovery of real property conveyed
to Salt Lake County prior to September 1st, 1939, which
a.ccrued prior to the time of its enactment, is unconstitutional and therefore void, insofar as the same relates to such
property. (Proposed conclusion No. 6, Tr. 21) ·
Error No.· 18.
1

- ...,...,

•

~

1, .:.

That the .trial court erred in not concluding as a matterQf law t~at Plaintitf is entitled to a decree of the court
adjudging Plaintiff to be ~he owner q£ .said. property, and
that Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or interest
whatever in said prope~ty. or any part thereof. (Proposed.
conclusion No.7, Tr. 21}
Error No. 19.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of the· court
forever enjoining and debarring Defendant from asserting
any claim whate·ver in or to said property adverse to the
Plaintiff. (Proposed conclusion No. 8, T r. 21)
Error No. 20.
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a matter of law that Plaintiff is. entitled to a decree of the court
for all costs of court. (Proposed conclusion No. 9, Tr. 21)
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Error No. 21.
That the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
Defendant and against the Plaintiff, uno cause for action,"
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice (Tr.
31) is contrary to law.
Error No. 22.
That the judgment of the trial court barring and enjoining the Plaintiff from hereafter prosecuting or maintaining any action for the recovery of the said property or
for the possession of any pa·rt or portion thereof (Tr. 31),
is contrary to law.
Error No. 23.
That the judgment of the trial court awarding Defendant its costs herein (Tr" 32). is contrary to law.
Error No. 24.
That the trial court erred in not decreeing that the
Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of said property and that
the Defendant has no right, title, interest, estate or lien
wh~ever in or to said property or any part thereof. (Tr.
22)

Error No. 25.
That the trial court erred in not decreeing that the
Defendant be forever enjoined and debarred from asserting any claim whatever in or to the said property adverse
to the Plaintiff. (Tr. 22)
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Error

No.

26 .

. That ·the trial court erred in ·not decreeing costs to
.the Plaintiff. (Tr. 22)
Error No. 27.
That the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (Tr. 35)

ARGUMENT NO. 1

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED AND FILED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Even a cursory examination of the :findings signed
and :filed by the trial court leads one to the conclusion that
the court was very careless in the terminology therein
used, and completely disregarded undisputed evidence introduced by stipulation between the opposing parties. As
a result, these findings· are contrary to the evidence, as
indicated below:
(a) In paragraph 6 of said :findings (Tr. 26), the
court twice used the expression uconveyed or purported
to convey", referring to Plaintiff's chain of title to the
property concerned. The actual facts were that the fee
title was traced down to February 29th, 1936, at which
time it was in Mindwell C. Hunter, who on that date conveyed it to Irene Hunter Chamberlain, Plaintiff's predecessor in interest (Tr. 46). At that time, not even the audit-
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or's tax deed, which later in this brief will be shown as
void (Argument No. 2), had been exe.cuted. Then, on
November 21st, 1947, the said Irene Hunter Chamberlain;
now with the surname of McAlpine, quit-claimed to the
Plaintiff (Tr. 47, and Exhibit uA", Tr. 79), and thereby
conveyed to Plaintiff all her right, title and interest to the
property. (Section 78-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943.)
Thus, the trial court, had it followed the evidence,
should have found that Mindwell C. Hunter executed a
bargain and sale deed conveying the property to Irene
Hunter Chamberlain, who, under the surname o£ McAlpine, by quit-claim deed, conveyed all her right, title
and interest to the Plaintiff, which findings were proposed
by the Plaintiff (Tr. 18).
(b) The trial court, in paragraphs 7, .9, and 13 of its
findings, used the expression ((treasurer's sale", ~nd referred
to the property as having been u-sold" for the· 19 30 delinquent taxes (Tr. 27 to 29). As a matter of fact and of
law, as will be shown later (Arugment No.2), the treasurer's sale was void for lack of the proper auditor's affidavits
in the assessment rolls (required by Sections 5982 and 6006,
Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, known as Sections 80-7-9
and 80-8-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943). Only a purported sale took place, and the findings should have so stated,
as was proposed by the Plaintiff in its findings No. 7 and
9 (Tr. 18 and 19).
(c) Again in its findings Nos. 7, 12 and 13 (Tr. 27
to 29), the trial court used grossly misleading terms. The
court repeatedly referred to the property as having been
ustruck off and sold" to Salt Lake County. Also, in paragraph 12, the court made a finding to the effect that the
provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah
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1933, urelating to property being struck off to the County"
(Tr. 28 and 29), when amended by Chapter 101, Laws of
Utah 1939 uwere transferred to and embodied in Section
' 6." This is an absolute mis-statement of the
80-10-68, sub.
fact and of the provisions of the law, as will now be shown.
Section 80-10-66, which provided the method of foreclosing the tax lien prior to September 1st, 19 3 9, does not
even contain the expression ustruck off and sold". To accomplish the foreclosure, it directs the county auditor to
convey to the county by auditor's tax deed all property
sold at the treasurer's sale, which remains unredeemed at
the expiration of the redemption period. Also, there is no
sale therein provided. This statute remained effective until
September 1st, 19 39.
However, the 1939 Legislature completely revised the
procedure to foreclose the tax lien. Chapter 101, Laws of
Utah 1939, referred to in paragraph 12 of the trial court's
findings, to accomplish this purpose, repealed the provisions relating to the execution of the auditor's tax deed. In
fact, the last nineteen lines of Section 80-10-66, which provide·d for the auditor's tax deed, were deleted in the amended enactment of said Section. Section 80-10-68 was enacted
in its stead, and provides for a public crying auction sale
to be held by the county auditor each May, of properties
remaining unredeemed at the expiration of the redemption
period. Not one clause of those nineteen deleted lines mentioned above was incorporated into 80-10-68, or any subdivision therein contained. This new foreclosure statute,
for the first time, provides for the striking off and selling
tax properties to the county (Section 80-10-68 ( 6)).
In the case at bar, an auditor's tax deed was executed.
The property ne·ver was ustruck off and sold" to the coun-
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ty. 1-.o find that it was is not only untrue, but is using an
expression which cannot be found in the statutes in effect
at that time. In addition, for the trial court to find that
the provisions in effect prior to September lst, 19 39 (Section 80-10-66), were transferred to and embodied in Sec~
tion 80-10-68 ( 6), is absolutely false.
Thus, the trial court should have found, merely, that
an auditor's tax deed was issued on March 31st, 1936, which
conforms to the evidence, and which was proposed by
Plaintiff (Tr. 18 and 19).
(d) The trial court found, in paragraph 9 of its findings (Tr. 27 and 28), that the Defendant upurchased"
the property from the county. This is not true. As will be
pointed out in Argument No. 2 herein, where supporting
cases will be cited, no interest passed to the Defendant at
die time it paid for, and received the county deed. The
only legal effect of this transaction was to discharge any
lien that may have theretofore existed (Argument No.2).
(e) The trial court, in paragraph No. 9 of its findings, again failed to follow the undisputed evidence, as it
found that the Defendant unegotiated" for the property
in question in the summer of 1941. Absolutely no evidence
appears any place in the transcript of testimony to support
such a finding.
Thus, it must be concluded that the findings signed
and :filed by the trial court served only to confuse the real
issues, and a false foundation was thereby laid for the conclusions of law and judgment which followed. On the
other hand, the :findings as proposed by the Plaintiff not
only avoided useless repetition (see paragraphs 10 to 14 of
the trial court's :findings, Tr. 28 and 29), but set forth the
ultimate facts produced at the trial. Consequently, these
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findings should have been signed and filed by the trial court.
Having now disposed of Errors No. 1 to 7, inclusive,
the foundation is laid for a discussion of the principles of
law applicable to the fact situation which is before this
Court.

ARGUMENT NO. 2.
DEFENDANT'S TAX TITLE IS DEFECTIVE
The true .facts which should have been found by the
trial court being that the fee title on February 29th, 1936,
descended to Irene· Hunter Chamberlain, and that she quitclaimed on November 21st, 1947, to the Plaintiff, the next
logical step is to determine whether the tax title of the
Defendant cuts off the· rights of the Plaint,iff's predecessor
in interest, and therefore, the Plaintiff itself.
Briefly, it is the position of the Plaintiff that the
treasurer's sale on December 22nd, 1930, was void; that
the· subsequent auditor's tax deed dated March ~1st, 1936,
also was void; and, consequently, that the Defendant received no interest in and to the property by virtue of the
county deed to it dated November 7th, 1941.
The· stipulated evidence shows (Tr. 69 and 70), and
the trial court found (Finding No. 8, Tr. 27) that the two
auditor's affidavits required by Se.ctions 5982 and 6006,
Compiled Laws of Utah 1917 (Sections 80-7-9 and 80-8-7,
Utah Code Annotated 1943) were not attached to the
assessment roll for the year 1930.
The Plaintiff respectfully refers this Court to the following cases: Telonis v. Stale·y, 104 Utah 537, 144 Pac.
(2) 513; Tree v. White, 171 Pac. (2) 398; Petterson v.
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Ogden City, 176 Pac. (2) 599·; Equitable Life and Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Schoewe, 10 5 Utah 569, 144 Pac. ( 2)
52 6. In all of these Utah cases, the lack of either of the two
auditor's affidavits has been held to be fatal to the treasur~
er's sale and the auditor's tax deed. In the Equitable Life
& Casualty Insurance Co. v. Schoewe case, supra, the court
on page 527 stated: uwe hold that both of these auditor's
affidavits are essential, and that both must be executed
and attached to the assessment roll . . . . . By reason of the
failure of the County Auditor to execute and attach his
affidavits to the assessment roll as required by the statutes,
the tax sale for the year 1936 was invalid, and the tax deed
issued to Plaintiff and Appellant is likewise invalid."
Thus, in the instant case, the treasurer's sale of the
property for the unpaid 1930 taxes, and the subsequent tax
deed issued by the county auditor on March 31st, 1936, are
invalid. Consequently, the conveyance by the county on
November 7th, 1941, to the Defendant is void and of no
effect.
The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant, when it
received the county deed on November 7th, 1941, received
absolutely no interest whatever in and to the property concerned. In Anson v. Ellison, 140 Pac. ( 2) 6 53, another
Utah case, wherein the tax title was held to be void, and
the holder thereof attempted to assert a lien for the taxes
originally assessed and which he had paid, this Court said:
uThe lien which is given to the County is a right to resort
to the property for the tax debt, but where the tax debt
is paid by a sale to a private purchaser, the debt is paid and
the right to resort to the property is gone. There is no right
to resort to the property for a reimbursement of the purchase p·rice paid to the County. The statute gives no such
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right nor does the law. The principle of caveat emptor
applies·." Please· see also Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509,
261 Pac. 450, and Reeve v. Blatchley, 106 Utah 259, 147
Pac. (2) 861, at page 863.
There is but one conclusion: Inasmuch as no interest
passed to the Defendant by virtue of the county deed, the
fee title remained in Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine,
who, on November 21st, 1947, quit-claimed all her interest to the Plaintiff. Thus, the trial court should have signed
and filed paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's proposed conclusions of law (fr.· 20), as set out in Errors No. 12, 13
and 14, to the effect that the treasurer's sale and the tax
deed were null arid void; that no interest passed to the Defendant by the county deed; and that the Plaintiff is the
owner of the fee title.
ARGUMENT NO. 3.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 104-2-5, UTAH
CODE ANNO·TATED 1943.
The next logical step in the discussion of the respective
rights of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in and to the
property concerned, is to determine whether the rights
of the Plaintiff have been cut off by any one of the several statutes of limitation relied upon by the Plaintiff. The
first one considered herein is Section 104-2-5, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, referred to in Defendant's Amendment
to Amended Answer (Tr. 14), which the trial court ignored in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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The Amendment to Amended Answer, as set up by
the Defendant (Tr. 14), alleges in substance that n~either
the Plaintiff nor its predecessor in interest was seised or
possessed of the property within seven years of the commencement of this action.
The Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of Section
104-2-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which provides, in
substance, that the possession of real property is presumed
to be in the one establishing a legal title to the property,
and that the occupation of the same by any other person
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to
the legal title, unle~s it shall affirmatively appear that the
property has been held and possessed adversely to the legal
title for seven years before the commencement of the
action.
In the instant case, Plaintiff's predecessor had legal
title, as shown in Argument No. 2, to which the Plaintiff
succeeded. The Defendant did not take possession until
August, 1941. This action was filed on January lOth, 1948
(please see reverse side of Complaint, Tr. 2), which was six
years and five months afterwards. Thus, the :first seven
months of the seven-year period prior to the bringing of
this action must be credited to the Plaintiff's predecessor.
Consequently, the provision of Section 104-2-5, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, requiring possession within seven years,
has been met, and the trial court should have so concluded
as a matter of law, as propose·d by Plaintiff in conclusion
No. 4 (Tr. 20), and referred to in Error No. 15.
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ARGUMENT NO. 4.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION DOES NOT COME
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 19,
PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 1943, DESIGNATED
AS SECTION 104-2-5.10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943.
For the purposes of this brief, Appellant appends
names to the statutes concerned, as follows:
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933,
which. provided the· procedure to foreclose the county tax
lien by an auditor.'s tax deed, shall be referred to as the
((Auditor's Tax D·eed Statute".
The Section known as 80-10-68 ( 6), Utah Code Annotated 1943, which became effective September 1st, 1939,
and which replaced the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute as the
m·ea~s· of foreclosing county tax liens, by providing that
all proporties not struck off to the public at a public, crying auction sale in May of each year, shall be struck off
and sold to the county by the county auditor, shall be
called the uStruck Off and Sold Statute".
Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which
provides a four-year limitation period on property struck
off and sold to the county under the Struck off and Sold
Statute (Section 80-10-68 (6)), shall be called the
uStruck Off and Sold Limitation Statute."
The said Struck O·ff and Sold Limitation Statute (Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943) as amended
by the· provisions of Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah
1947, whereby the limitation statute is extended to include
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property conveyed to the county prior to September 1st,
1939, under the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute (Section
80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933), shall be called
the ucombination Limitation Statute."
In considering Plaintiff's Errors No. 8 and 16, it is
contended by the Plaintiff that the Struck Off· and Sold
Li1nitation Statute, by its own provisions, excludes the
property concerned in this action.
The Struck Qf:!_and Sold Limitation Statute (Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section
104-2-5.10, Utah COde Annotated 1943) reads as follows:
uNo action for the recovery of real property struck
off and sold to the county, as provided by section 80-10-68
(6), Utah Code Annotated 1943, or for the possession
thereof shall be maintained and no defense or counterclaim to any action involving the recovery of p.roperty, or
the defense of title to property, sold at such tax sale, or
public or private sale, or for possession thereof, shall be set
up or maintained, unless the same be brou-ght or set up
within four years from date on which the sale was held.
Provided, however, that an action may be maintained or
defense set up within four years from the effective date of
this act with respect to real property sold prior to said effective date."
As will be observed, this Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute,.· by its own provisions, is very limited in its
scope. In the first place, it includes only property foreclosed
under the provisions of the Struck Off and Sold Statute
(Section 80-10-68 ( 6)). No reference is made to property
conveyed to the county under the Auditor's Tax Deed
Statute.
Secondly, this Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute
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does not pretend to protect the assignee of the county's
interest in the original treasurer's sale, after he secures his
tax deed. Neither does it protect the public who buys in at
the crying auction sale under the provisions of the Struck
Off and Sold Statute (Section 80-10-68 ( 4) and (5)).
It only protects the .county in regard to property which is
struck off and sold to it.
·
There is another point about this statute that must
not be overlooked, as it is vital in determining its application. The limitation period therein provided runs from
the u date on which the sale was held". Also, an action or
defense is permitted within four years from the effective
date of the act uwith respect to real property sold' prior to
said effective date."
The Court's attention is respectfully called to the following expressions in the Struck Off and Sold Limitation
Statute: c:c:sold. at such tax sale"; ufrom the date on which
the sale was held"; ((real property sold prior to said effective
date"; ureal property struck off and sold to the county,
as provided by section 80-10-68 ( 6), Utah Code Annotated 1943." These expressions are consistent, only, with one
conclusion: The Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute
is a limitation statute on prop~erty ustruck off and sold"
to the county under the provisions of the Struck Off and
Sold Statute, and on none· other.
This conclusion becomes more certain when one considers the Struck Off and Sold Statute and the Auditor's
Tax Deed Statute, which it replaced in 1939. Each of these
two tax lien foreclosure statutes provides a distinct method
of foreclosing the tax lien. The procedure in each is entire-
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ly different from that of the other, not only in manner,
but also in the timing of the requirements and events there·in set forth.
In view of the foregoing, it would defy all reason to
conclude that the Struck Off and Sold Limitation ~tatute,
specifically referring only to property struck off and sold
to the county under the provisions of the Struck Off and
Sold Statute by section number, includes, also, property
conveyed to the county under the Auditor's Tax Deed
Statute.
In the instant case, the foreclosure of the alleged. tax
lien took place March 31st, 1936, under the Auditor's Tax
Deed_Statute {Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah
1933), several years before the Struck Off and Sold Statute
was enacted. The property never was struck off and sold.
It necessarily follows that no date of sale can be established
from which the limitation period can run. Only an invalid
auditor's tax deed was executed as shown in Argument No.
2 herein.
As a result, there is but one final conclusion. The Plaintiff's a.ction does not come within the provisions of Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, herein called the
Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute. Thus, the trial
court was in error in concluding as a matter of law that
this statute did bar Plaintiff's action {Error No. 8) , but
should have concluded otherwise {Error No. 16) as proposed by the Plaintiff (Tr. 20 and 21).
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ARGUMENT NO. 5.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION DOES NOT COME
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 19,
PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 1943, DESIGNATED
AS SECTION 104-2-5.10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 8,
PAGE 19, LAWS OF UTAH 1947.
In proper sequence, the next issue to discuss is. whether or not the property in the case at bar comes within the
provisions of th~ Combination Limitation Statute, which
is the original Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute as
amended by the 1947 Session Laws, which reads as follows:
uNo action for the recovery of real property struck
off and sold to the County under the provisions of Section
80-10-68 (6), u·tah Code Annotated 1943, or conveyed
to the County prior to September 1, 1939, by auditor's
deed under the provisions of Section 8 0-10-66, Revised
Statutes of Utah 193 3, or for the possession thereof, shall
be maintained, and no counterclaim for the recovery of
such property or for the possession thereof shall be interposed unless the same be brought or interposed within four
years from the date of such sale, or within four years from
the date of the issuance of such auditor's deed."
Having already eliminated that part of the statute
quoted above which refers to property ustruck off and sold
to the County" (Argument No. 4), we now pass on to
consider whether the new provision relating to auditor's
tax deeds applies to the property in question.
In the instant case, the purported treasurer's sale in
1930 and the auditor's tax deed predicated thereon, which
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was executed March 31st, 1936, are invalid, as shown conclusively in Argument No. 2. Briefly, at the time the purported treasurer's sale was made, the county only had a
lien for the unpaid taxes, which continued to the date of
the auditor's tax deed. As concluded in Argument No. 2,
the tax deed being invalid, the county still only had a lien
for the unpaid taxes. In other words, the execution of the
auditor's tax deed in 1936 to Salt Lake County made abso.;.
lutely no change in the status of the property nor that of
the parties concerned, and conveyed nothing whatsoever
to the County, being a nullity. The supporting cases are
set out in said Argument No.2, and will not be repeated in
this argument.
Consequently, the property in question, having never
been conveyed to the County of Salt Lake by auditor's tax
deed or otherwise, does not come within the express provisions of this Combination Limitation Statute. Thus,
this statute does not apply to the case at bar, and the trial
court should have so concluded as a matter of law, cited
herein as Errors No.9 and 16, and which was proposed by
Plaintiff (Proposed conclusion No. 5, Tr. 20 and 21).
ARGUMENT NO. 6.
SECTION I 04-2-6, AS AMENDED BY
CHAPTER 20, PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH
1943, DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S ACTION.
Section 104-2-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22,
Laws of Utah 1943, reads as follows, that part of which
was added by said amendment being shown in italics:
uNo cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an
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action, founded upon the title to real property or to rents
or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the
action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or
the an.cestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was
seised or possessed of the property in question within seve~
years before the committing of the act in respect to which
such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made;

provided, however, that with respe.ct to actions involving
real property held under tax deed, the action mus.t be
brought or defense or counterclaim interposed within the
time prescribed by section 104-2-5.10 of this code."
· ·This act is so drawn, that ((with respe.ct to actions involving real property held under tax deed," defenses as
well as actions themselves are barred. Thus, should this
Court apply this section to Plaintiff's action as a bar, it
should also apply it to the Defendant's defense as a bar,
and it, in e·ffect, becomes a nullity.
The amendment to Section 104-2-6 was enacted at
the same session of the Legislature at which the Struck Off
and Sold Lhnitation Statute was enacted. It is very evident that its purpose· was to make special provision in Section 104-2-6 for property uheld under tax deed", and in
so doing, refers to the Struck Off and Sold Limitation
Statute for the limitation period and the kind of tax
properties. to which it applies.
Thus, the property conc~erned is placed right ba.ck into
the provisions of the Struck O·:ff and Sold Limitation Statute
and the Combination Limitation Statute. These matters
have been discussed at length in Arguments No. 4 and 5
herein, and will not be· r~epea ted.
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However, the conclusion is just the same. The
property in this case was neither ustruck off and sold to the
County", nor was it conveyed to the county under auditor's tax deed. Consequently, neither does Section 1042-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah
1943, apply to it, and the trial court should have so held
(Error No. 10).
In Argument No. 7, it will be shown that the Combination Limitation Statute is unconstitutional, and, therefore, is void. This being the case, then the unconstitutionality of it will also affect the validity of Section 104-2-6,
insofar as the same relates to property conveyed to the
county by auditor's tax deed.
ARGUMENT NO. 7.
CHAPTER 19, PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH
1943, DESIGNATED AS SECTION 104-2-5.10, UTAH CO·DE ANNOTATED 1943, AS
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 8, PAGE 19,
LAWS OF UTAH 1947, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, INSOFAR AS THE SAME RELATES TO· PROPERTY CONVEYED TO
THE COUNTY BY AUDITOR'S TAX DEED
PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 1st, 1939.
The original enactme·nt of Section 104-2-5.10, herein
referred to as the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute,
passed by the 1943 L·egislature as Chapter 19, page 22,
provided a four-year limitation period for property struck
off and sold to the county as provided by the Struck Off
and Sold Statute, Section 80-10-68 (6), and for none
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other (Argument No.4). Prior to that time, one attempting to uphold a tax title was required to rely upon seven
years of adverse possession. But this statute, insofar as
property struck off and sold to the county was concerned,
reduced the limitation period from seven years of adverse
possession, to the expiration of a four-year period from the
date the property was struck off and sold to the county,
without any requirement of adverse possession. However,
the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute, by its express
terms, provided four years in which to bring actions on
property sold prior to the effective date of the act.
But when the 1947 Legislature amended the Struck
Off and Sold Limitation Statute by Chapter 8, page 19,
Laws of Utah 1947, herein called the Combination Limitation Statute, it enlarg,ed its provisions to include property
conveyed to the county by auditor's tax deed prior to September 1st, 1939, under the provisions of Section 80-10-66,
the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute. This had the effect of
reducing the limitation period on actions involving this
class of properties from seven years . .of adverse possession,
to the expiration of a four-year period from the date of
the execution of the auditor's tax deed, without any requirement of adverse possession. But unlike the Struck
Off and Sold Limitation Statute, the Combination Limitation Statute did not provide any time in which to bring
actions which had accrued prior to the effective date of
the act. In fact, inasmuch as more than four years had
elapsed between September 1st, 1939, after which no
auditor's tax deeds were issued to the county under the
Auditor's Tax Statute, and May 13th, 1947, the effective
date of the Combination Limitation Statute, its effect was
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to cut off completely and summarily, all actions on such
property without exception.
It is herein conceded that the Legislature may re·duce
the limitation period on legal actions. But it is contended
by the Plaintiff that in so doing, th=e Legislature must
provide a reasonable time in which to file actions which
theretofore had accrued, which the Utah Legislature failed
to do in this instance, or the statute·, insofar as it relates to
such actions, is unconstitutional.
In support of this proposition, the Plaintiff cites 34
Am. Jur. pages 33 and 34, under the title uLimitations of
Action", paragraph 28, uShortening of Statutory Period,"
which reads in part as follows:
uunless forbidden by the State Constitution, the
legislature may constitutionally shorten periods of limitation :fixed by previously existing statutes, and make the
amendment applicable to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable time is left in which such actions may
be commenced. The question as to what shall be considered such a reasonable time is for the determination of the
legislature, and is in no sense a judicial question. Unless
the time allowed is so manifestly insufficient that it becomes a denial of justice, the court will not interfere
with the legislative discretion.
u • • • It is clear, however, that a statute which declares
that a period already lapsed shall bar an action upon a contract is an arbitrary destruction of contractual rights, and
therefore, unconstitutional, as would also be a statute
which practically denied a party the right to sue on an
existing cause of action, by shortening the period of limitations without leaving a reasonable time thereafter in which
to bring the action."
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These same principles are announced in 12 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, paragraph 445, uStatutes of Limitation"; also in Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E.
402, and many other cases cited in the footnotes of both
citations in Am. Jur., supra.
In Chapman v. Douglas County, 107 U. S. 348,
27 L. ed. 378, 2 S. Ct. 62, the court held that an existing
right of action cannot be taken away by shortening the
period of limitation to a time which has already run.
In Gilbert v. Ackerman, 139 N.Y. 118, 53 N. E. 753,
45 LRA 118, the court said (page 120):
u • • • The only restriction upon the legislature in the
enactment of statutes of limitation is that a reasonable
time be allowed for suits upon .causes of action therefore
ex1sttng. Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; People v.
Turner, 117.·N. Y. 227. The question of reasonableness,
naturally and primarily, is with the legislature; and. when
the question is brought before the court the surrounding
circumstances are regarded in determining whether the
legislature, in prescribing a period of limitation, has erred
to the prejudice of substantial rights. Th,e claim against
another is property; and if a statute of limitations, acting
upon that right, deprives the claimant of reasonable· time
within which suit may be brought, it violates the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law."
This lack of providing a reasonable time in which to
bring actions which had accrued before the effective date
of a limitation statute, wherein the period is shortened,
has been held, universally, to be a violation of the udue
process" clause of the Federal Constitution, and of the
constitutions of the various states. In fact, so universal is
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this principle of law, that no case to the contrary can be
found.
In the case at bar, our Legislature, in enacting the
Combination Limitation Statute, not only failed to provide a reasonable time in which to file actions which had
theretofore accrued, but declared a period already lapsed
to bar such actions. In view of the authorities hereinabove
cited, which adhere to a universal principle of constiutional
law, this Combination Limitation Statute is in violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution of the Unite~
States (Amendment XIV), and of the Constitution of the
State of Utah (Article I, Section 7).
Thus, insofar as the said Combination Limitation
Statute (Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah, 1943, des~
ignated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
as amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947)
relates to property conveyed to the county by auditor's
tax deed prior to September 1st, 1939, it should have been
declared unconstitutional by the trial court, as proposed
by the Plaintiff in its conclusion No. 6 (Tr. 21). In failing
so to do, the said trial court erred (Error No. 17}.
ARGUMENT NO. 8.
DEFENDANT IS NOT. ENTITLED TO AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF.
The Defendant, in its Amended Answer (Tr. 12),
prays uthat said plaintiff be hereafter forever enjoined and
debarred from asserting any claim whatever in or to said
property adverse to defenda~t." The Amended Answer
(Tr. 10 to 12, inclusive) and the Amendment to the
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Amended Answer (Tr. 14), do not contain a counterclaim nor a cross-complaint. The Defendant merely
pleaded specially to each paragraph of the Complaint, and
then set up an affirmative defense.
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as no counterclaim
was set up by the Defendant, and no fee paid to the county
clerk therefor, the said Defendant was not entitled to a
judgment barring and enjoining the Plaintiff from hereafter prosecuting or maintaining any action for the recovery of the property concerned ( Tr. 31 ) , and the trial
court was in error in granting such -affirmative relief (Error No. 22).
SUMMARY
By way of recapitulation, the Plaintiff summarizes
the foregoing arguments as follows:
1. The trial court grossly disregarded undisputed,
stipulated evidence, thereby laying a false foundation for
conclusions of law and judgment, ~§_.Jpll._Qws:
(a) The trial court should have found that Irene
Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine had the fee title, which
she quit-claimed to the Plaintiff.
(b) The :findings that a utreasurer's sale" took
place and that the property was usold" for the 1930
delinquent taxes, are not supported by the law and the evidence.
(c) The findings that the property was ustruck off
and sold" to the county, and that certain provisions of the
Auditor's Tax Deed Statute were transferred to and incorporated into the Struck Off and Sold Statute, are not
true.
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(d) The finding that Defendant upurchased" the
property from the county is not supported by the law and
the evidence.
(e) No evidence exists in the transcript that Defendant unegotiated" for the property in the summer
of 1941.
2. The treasurer's tax sale and the auditor's tax deed
predicated thereon are void for lack of the two auditor's
affidavits required by law; nothing was conveyed by the
county to the Defendant by virtue of the county deed;
and Plaintiff, t~erefore, is the owner of the fee title.
3. Plaintiff is not barred by Section 104-2-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, as its predecessor in in.terest had
possession during seven months of the seven-year period
preceding the filing of this action.
4. Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of.
the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute, for the reason
that the property, having been the subject of an auditor's
tax deed and having not been struck off and sold to the
county, does not come within the provisions of said statute.
5. Plaintiff's action does not come within the provisions of the Combination Limitation Statute, for the
reason that the tax deed was invalid, and no conveyance
of the property to the county took place, as required by
the provisions of said statute.
6. Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions
of Section 104-2-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22,
Laws of Utah 1943, for the reason that said statute refers
to the provisions of the Struck Off and Sold Limitation
Statute and the Combination Limitation Statute, which
are shown herein not to apply, the latter being unconstitutional.
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7. Plaintiff's a.ction is not barred by the prov1s1ons

of the Combination Limitation Statute, for the reason that
said statute violates the due process clause of both State
and Federal Constitutions, in not providing a period of
time in which to file actions which accrued prior to its
effective date.
8. The Defendant, having not pleaded a counterclaim, should not have been granted affirmative relief.
CONCLUSION
. In view of the foregoing arguments, there is no alternative but to conclude ~that the Plaintiff succeeded to the
fee.·.ti~le_ to' the .property concerned, and that said title of
Plaintiff is not abrogated. by any of the statutes of limitation relied upon by the Defendant. Thus, in the instant
cas~, the Plaintiff and not . the Defendant, s~ould have
prevailed and been granted judgment by the trial court
.
quieting its title in and to this property.
Thus, it follows naturally, logic~lly, and without further argument; that the trial court should have concluded
as matters of law, in addition to those set out in the foregoing arguments, and should have rendered judgment,
as follows:
The trial court should not have concluded and
adjudged in favor of the Defendant uno cause of action"
(Tr. 31), cited herein as Errors No. 11 and 21.
The trial court should have concluded and rendered
judgment that Plaintiff is the owner of said property, and
that Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or interest
whatever in the same, as proposed in Plaintiff's conclusion
No. 7 and paragraph No. I of Plaintiff's proposed judg-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
ment (Tr. 21 and 22), cited as Errors No. 18 and 24, and
should have enjoined said Defendant from asserting any
claim to the same adverse to the Plaintiff (Plaintiff's proposed conclusion No.8, and proposed judgment, paragraph
No.2, Tr. 21 and 22), cited herein as Errors No. 19 and 25.
The trial court should have concluded and rendered
judgment awarding costs to the Plaintiff, as proposed by
Plaintiff's conclusion No. 9, and judgment paragraph
No. 3, and not to the Defendant (Tr. 21, 22 and 32), and
cited herein as Errors No. 20, 23 and 26.
Because the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment as signed by the trial court are contrary to the
facts and the law, the said court should have granted
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial (Tr. 34 and 3 5), cited as
Error No. 27.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Plaintiff and.
Appellant contends that the judgment of the trial court as
made and entered, together with the findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon which the same is predicated,
are not supported by the stipulated and undisputed evidence, and are contrary to law.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM D. CALLISTER,
Attorney for Appellant.
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